Land use supervision and environmental pollution: multitasking bureaucrats and spillovers across regulations
研究发现中国土地督察局的设立在减少土地违规的同时，导致地方官员放松环境监管，加剧了城市污染，尤其对晋升激励强的官员辖区影响更大。
Abstract This article provides evidence on the strong spillover effects of land use regulations on environmental regulation enforcement in China. We find that the establishment of China’s Land Supervision Bureaus, which effectively reduced land use violations, led to a significant relaxation of environmental regulations by local officials and an increase in cities’ pollution intensity and overall pollution. In addition, the detrimental environmental effects of land use supervision are particularly strong among cities governed by officials with stronger promotion incentives. The results are consistent with a model in which multitasking local officials loosen environmental regulations to meet GDP growth targets in response to reduced industrial land supply. We further support the model by documenting land use supervision’s negative effect on new firm entries but significantly positive effect on incumbent firms’ outputs.