Disclosure in Incentivized Reviews: Does It Protect Consumers?
研究发现，美国联邦贸易委员会要求激励性评论者披露与卖家的关联，但披露并未消除评分膨胀，反而误导消费者购买更差产品。
The well-documented rating inflation of incentivized reviews (IRs) can mislead consumers into choosing a product that they would otherwise not buy. To protect consumers from this undesirable influence, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission recommends that reviewers conspicuously disclose any material connection they may have with sellers. In theory, such disclosures safeguard consumers by motivating reviewers to be truthful and inducing consumers to discount inflated IR ratings. Our research finds, however, that IR disclosure accomplishes neither. Specifically, our empirical analysis of consumer reviews on Amazon reveals that, even with disclosure, (1) rating inflation of IRs remains, and (2) this inflation boosts sales at consumers’ expense. Finally, we propose an alternative approach to eliminate rating inflation of IRs and empirically demonstrate its effectiveness. These findings have important implications for consumers, firms, and ongoing policy discussions around IRs. This paper was accepted by Duncan Simester, marketing. Funding: S. Park gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Darla Moore School of Business Research Grant Program at the University of South Carolina. W. Shin gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Brian R. Gamache Endowed Professorship at the University of Florida. J. Xie gratefully acknowledges financial support from the JCPenney Endowed Professorship at the University of Florida. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00930 .