The impact of labor on the performance of founder‐family firms
研究美国创始人家族企业中的家族继承是否降低企业价值，发现这类继承多发生在低增长行业和制造业/零售业，且通过改善劳资关系补偿了管理人才池较小的成本，并未降低企业价值。
Abstract Firms managed by the scions of founders continue to be prevalent in the United States despite the increase in shareholder activism over the last few decades, calling into question the argument that such organizational structures reduce firm value. Founder‐family successions are rare in high‐growth industries where the benefits of selecting from a larger pool of managers is significant. Rather, they tend to happen in low‐growth industries, in manufacturing/retail firms. Once we account for the differences in firm characteristics, we do not find that founder‐family successions reduce firm value. We explore a mechanism that compensates for the costs of choosing from a smaller pool of managers and document evidence consistent with family firms benefiting from improved labor relations.