不诚实的传染性:腐败丑闻与超市盗窃

Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2023
被引 28
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

研究腐败丑闻是否会影响超市顾客在自助结账时偷窃的倾向,发现丑闻发生后偷窃概率增加16%,且非由物质激励变化驱动。

Abstract

Is dishonest behavior contagious? We answer this question by studying whether corruption scandals affect the propensity of supermarket customers to steal while using a self-service checkout system. Crucially, this system allows shoppers to engage in dishonest behavior by underreporting the value of their shopping cart. Exploiting data from random audits on shoppers, we show that the probability of stealing increases by 16 percent after a local corruption scandal breaks. This effect is not driven by any change in material incentives. Suggestive evidence shows that it is driven by a reduction in the self-imposed cost of stealing.

腐败丑闻不诚实行为传染超市盗窃自助结账系统