Hot town, corruption in the city: Assessing the impact of form of government on corruption using propensity scores
利用美国1990-2020年市级数据，通过倾向评分匹配等方法，发现议会-经理制政府形式比市长-议会制更能降低腐败风险，支持专业主义-绩效模型。
Abstract This research explores the relationship between form of government and corruption using national municipal level data (1990–2020) using competing theoretical models; the principal–agent model and the professionalism–performance model. The principal–agent model suggests that the additional scrutiny provided by the electoral process will lead to a lower risk of corruption under the mayor–council form of government. The professionalism–performance model suggests that the professional training and incentives in place in the council–manager form will lead to a lower risk of corruption. However, it is difficult to examine the impact of the form of government on the incidence of corruption because there may be underlying community characteristics, such as population and poverty levels, that drive both the selection of form and corruption. Using propensity score matching and other propensity score methods to reduce the impact of confounding factors, this analysis finds robust evidence that the council–manager form reduces the risk of corruption, supporting the professionalism–performance model.