On the voluntary disclosure of redundant information
研究了企业为何自愿披露随后会被后续公告覆盖的短期信息，发现当披露成本足够低时，经理人会为了提升长期股价而披露冗余信息。
Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of information which is subsumed by a later announcement? We consider a model in which the firm's manager can choose to disclose short-term information which becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are sufficiently low, the manager discloses even if she only cares about the long-term price of the firm. Intuitively, by disclosing, she causes early investors to trade less aggressively, reducing price informativeness, which in turn increases information acquisition by late investors. The subsequent increase in acquisition more than offsets the initial decrease in price informativeness and, consequently, improves long term prices.