Optimal Reporting Systems in Bank Runs
研究了银行在获得早期但不精确的投资业绩估计时，如何设计财务报告系统以维护金融稳定，发现最优报告系统要求低于某阈值时完全披露，否则不披露，且该阈值与银行挤兑风险呈U形关系。
ABSTRACT We study the role of reporting systems in the context of bank runs. In our model, a bank receives an early but imprecise estimate of its investment performance, and its financial reporting system generates a report. We find that, from a financial-stability standpoint, the optimal reporting system requires full disclosure when the bank’s early estimate is below a certain threshold, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, such optimal reporting threshold should be tailored to the bank’s exposure to bank-run risk. In particular, the threshold is nonmonotonic and U-shaped in the bank-run risk. We also relate our results to current accounting standards and discuss their implications for policy-making and empirical research. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; M41; M48.