Coordinating farms in collective agri-environmental schemes: the role of conditional incentives
研究了法国阿尔萨斯一项集体农业环境计划，该计划在集体区域内所有农户的保育土地比例达到临界阈值时才支付报酬，分析了农户参与和贡献的影响因素。
Abstract This paper analyses data from a novel collective agri-environmental scheme (cAES) in Alsace, France, designed to protect the local European hamster population by motivating farmers to engage in habitat conservation measures. In contrast to typical conservation contracts that pay individual farmers based on their own performance, the cAES studied here pays farmers only when the percentage of land conserved by all farmers within a collective zone reaches a critical threshold. We find that the likelihood of participation is higher for farmers with a relatively large agricultural surface within the collective zone, increases with the number of farmers in a collective zone, and increases over time. Those with more land in the collective zone allocate more acreage to conservation. We define different contributor types and provide insight into the possible motives underlying contributions to collective conservation schemes.