A Spoonful of Sugar: Deference at the Court of Justice
本文分析欧洲法院在初步裁决程序中如何策略性地使用顺从作为韧性技术，发现法院在扩张欧盟法律时更倾向顺从，而在宣布国家措施不符合欧盟法律时则较少顺从，挑战了关于顺从使用的常见假设。
Abstract This article analyses the European Court of Justice's strategic use of deference as a resilience technique in the preliminary reference procedure. It focuses on the strategic potential of using deference in two scenarios: first, when the Court uses teleological interpretation or expands the scope of the EU legal order and, second, when it declares national measures incompatible with EU law. The findings indicate that the Court is more likely to use deference when expanding EU law and less likely to defer when it declares national measures incompatible with EU law. The article challenges commonly held assumptions regarding the use of deference. First, the findings substantially qualify accounts linking the increase of deference to the maturity of the EU legal order and a certain halt of judicial activism. Deference allows the Court to explore new frontiers of EU law, suggesting that although the legal order might have matured, the Court does not perceive the project of legal integration as completed. Second, the article defies claims that deference is used by the Court as a ‘weapon of restraint’.