When do bureaucrats respond to external demands? A theoretical framework and empirical test of bureaucratic responsiveness
通过离散选择实验和定性访谈，研究欧盟机构官僚如何根据需求来源、内容及媒体关注度决定回应优先级，发现不同需求类型下权威利益相关者不同，且负面媒体关注仅增强对技术和道德需求的回应。
Abstract Bureaucrats must balance neutral competence with responsiveness to external demands. As external demands are simultaneous and multidimensional, this study analyzes bureaucratic responsiveness according to bureaucratic actors' prioritization decisions. Using a discrete choice experiment followed by qualitative interviews in the context of EU agencies, we investigate to what extent bureaucratic responsiveness depends upon the stakeholder that expresses an external demand (source), the aspect of bureaucratic conduct that is addressed (content), and the presence of adverse media attention (salience). In addition to corroborating prior empirical findings, we provide a novel understanding of bureaucratic responsiveness by showing the way demands' source and content affect responsiveness jointly. Across the range of technical, performative, legal‐procedural, and moral demands, we identify which stakeholders can impose demands most authoritatively. We also extend previous research by demonstrating that adverse media attention strengthens responsiveness to technical and moral demands, but not to performative and legal‐procedural demands.