A Behavioral Account of Opportunistic Diversification: Evidence from Non-Real-Estate Firms’ Investment in Real Estate
研究发现，当企业主营业务的业绩落后于同行高利润业务时，高管会因社会比较而增加对高利润新业务（如房地产）的投资，这虽能改善短期业绩但可能损害长期表现。
Abstract This study provides a behavioral account of opportunistic diversification. We argue that top executives’ social comparison with peer firms based on business segment performance can lead them to increase their investments in high-profitability new businesses (i.e., opportunistic diversification). Specifically, when the performance of a firm's main business relative to its peer firms’ high-profitability business segment falls short of their aspirations, the firm's top executives will engage in problemistic search and subsequently increase opportunistic diversification. This effect is stronger when the firm is similar to peer firms along key firm characteristics and when top executives of the firm are underpaid. Although opportunistic diversification helps improve a firm's short-term accounting performance, it may weaken its long-term performance. Using Chinese non-real-estate firms’ diversification investment in real estate as our empirical context, we find support for our arguments.