Seller Compound Search for Bidders*
研究了卖方在截止日期前通过复合搜索寻找投标人的最优策略，发现可通过一系列二级价格拍卖实现，其特征是保留价格递减、搜索强度递增，并分析了短期与长期投标人情况下的差异及效率损失来源。
This article studies a seller's compound search for bidders by a deadline. We show that the optimal search outcomes can be implemented by a sequence of second‐price auctions, characterized by declining reserve prices and increasing search intensities (sample sizes) over time. The monotonicity results are robust in both cases of short‐lived and long‐lived bidders. Furthermore, a seller with short‐lived bidders sets lower reserve prices and searches more intensively than one with long‐lived bidders. We also show that the inefficiency of an optimal search auction can stem from its inefficient search rule.