A dual approach to agency problems
提出一种对偶方法处理道德风险的标准模型，通过将激励约束替换为局部约束，将代理问题转化为对偶问题，利用凸结构推导解的存在性和唯一性条件，为理解先前的不存在性结果提供新视角。
This paper presents a dual approach to the standard model of moral hazard. We formulate the dual of the principal–agent problem under the assumption that the incentive constraint can be replaced by a local constraint (the first-order approach), to examine whether the relaxed agency problem yields a candidate solution. The dual formulation generates a convex conjugate, which transforms the agent’s utility from compensation into a dual functional. The dual problem features a simple convex structure, which enables us to perform a comprehensive analysis for the agency problem. We derive novel and more tractable conditions for existence and uniqueness of a solution to the problem with the dual elements. Furthermore, the approach to the dual problem provides illuminating insights into the previous nonexistence results.