Auction design and order of sale with budget-constrained bidders
通过实验室实验，研究了预算受限竞拍者环境下多物品拍卖的出售顺序和拍卖形式对收入的影响，发现先出售高价值物品更有利，且密封第一价格拍卖比英式拍卖收入更高。
Abstract The presence of financial constraints changes traditional auction theory predictions. In the case of multiple items, such constraints may affect revenue equivalence and efficiency of different auction formats. We consider a simple complete information setting with three financially constrained bidders and two items that have different values common to all the bidders. Using a laboratory experiment, we find that, as predicted by theory, it is more beneficial for the seller to sell the higher value item first. We then show that the first-price sealed-bid auction yields higher revenue than the English auction, with significant differences in learning of equilibrium strategies.