What Triggers Mortgage Default? New Evidence from Linked Administrative and Survey Data
利用专门设计的调查数据与行政数据匹配，发现流动性冲击几乎解释了所有违约，而缺乏流动性冲击的“策略性”违约远少于通常认知；负权益也并非多数止赎的触发因素。
Abstract Why do homeowners default on mortgages? This paper studies the question using a survey specifically designed for the purpose, with a sample drawn from (and matched to) rich administrative data. I find that a wide variety of typically unobserved liquidity shocks together trigger nearly all defaults, so “strategic” default with no liquidity trigger is much less common than it usually appears. Conversely, even in this uniquely rich data, I find that many foreclosures are not triggered by negative home equity, contrary to the predictions of almost every model in the literature.