Agency Frictions and Procurement: New Evidence from U.S. Electricity Restructuring*
研究了美国电力行业重组中电厂剥离对燃料采购成本的异质性影响，发现重组降低了三类企业的燃料采购成本：未受早期激励监管的企业、重组后议价能力强的企业以及重组前受不利煤炭合同约束的企业。
This article presents new quantitative evidence of the sources of efficiency benefits from deregulation. We estimate the heterogeneous effects of plant divestitures on fuel procurement costs during the restructuring of the U.S. electricity industry. Guided by economic theory, we focus on three mechanisms and find that restructuring reduced fuel procurement costs for firms that (i) were not subject to earlier incentive‐regulation programs, (ii) had relatively strong bargaining power as coal purchasers after restructuring, and (iii) were locked in with disadvantaged coal contracts prior to restructuring.