Regulatory Transparency and Regulators’ Effort: Evidence from Public Release of the SEC's Review Work
利用SEC在EDGAR上公开评论信这一透明度提升事件，研究发现监管透明度增加后，SEC工作人员审查更多文件且更及时，并提高了对潜在欺诈公司的调查概率，表明公开监管工作产出能缓解道德风险、提升工作绩效。
ABSTRACT Using the public release of comment letters on EDGAR to capture a regime shift toward regulatory transparency, we examine whether an increase in transparency affects regulators’ effort and work performance. We find that the SEC staff reviews more filings and more documents per filing following the disclosure regime shift. These effects are incrementally stronger for firms with comment letters that are expected to attract greater investor or public monitoring. Furthermore, under the new regime, reviews are more timely. Upon the regime switch, the likelihood of a restatement (receiving a comment letter) decreases (increases) for filings that are reviewed. After receiving a comment letter, a firm with signs of potential fraud is more likely to be investigated, and this effect becomes more pronounced under the new regime. Altogether, our findings suggest that publicly disclosing regulators’ work output can mitigate moral hazard (i.e., increase regulators’ work input), improving their work performance.