The decentralization of public employment services and local governments’ responses to incentives
利用芬兰临时改革，研究公共就业服务分权化如何影响就业服务提供和求职者结果，发现地方政府能将10%的失业救济成本转移给中央政府，但未改善劳动力市场结果。
Abstract We examine how the decentralization of public employment services (PES) affects the behavior and service provision of PES offices and the labor market outcomes of job seekers. We use difference-in-differences, utilizing a Finnish temporary reform during which PES were decentralized for specific groups of job seekers in treated municipalities and remained centralized for others. The reform presented the treated municipalities with the possibility of shifting costs to the central government. We find no evidence of better labor market outcomes and find evidence consistent with municipalities being able to shift 10% of their unemployment benefit costs to the central government.