The impact of compliance, board committees and insider CEOs on firm survival during crisis
研究了2007-2009年金融危机期间，英国FTSE 350公司的内部治理机制（合规、董事会委员会和内部CEO）对企业生存的影响，发现合规与生存负相关，而内部CEO和更多董事会委员会则提高生存概率。
This study investigates the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm survival during a financial crisis. Using a sample of FTSE 350 listed companies for the time period 2003–2010, our results show significant differences in the corporate governance mechanisms of firms that survived and those that failed during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. The findings indicate that compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code is negatively associated with the survival of firms when they experience exogenous shocks. However, the existence of insider CEOs and a higher number of board committees in organisations increase the chances of survival during an economic downturn. These findings have policy implications and show that non-compliance with a prescribed code of corporate governance does not necessarily lead to poor governance. Moreover, the establishment of extra board committees and CEO succession planning are shown as important dynamics in firms' strategic decisions, as they have implications for the survival of firms during difficult economic conditions.