Corporate social responsibility and network externalities: a game-theoretic approach
该研究在考虑企业社会责任而非利润最大化的前提下，用博弈论方法分析网络外部性市场中企业的产出承诺决策，发现均衡结果取决于社会关注强度和网络规模。
Abstract This research revisits the pioneering work by Katz and Shapiro (Am Econom Rev 75:424–440, 1985) with network (consumption) externalities in a twofold way: first, it considers Corporate Socially Responsible (CSR), instead of profit-maximising, firms; second, it uses a game-theoretic approach and analyses the commitment decision game in which firms face the binary choice to credibly commit ( $$C$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>C</mml:mi> </mml:math> ) or not to commit ( $$NC$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>NC</mml:mi> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> ) themselves to an announced output level in the first decision-making stage. Competition at the market stage occurs à la Cournot. Results show a rich spectrum of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes, ranging from the prisoner’s dilemma (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment conflict) to the anti-prisoner’s dilemma or deadlock (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment do not conflict), passing from the coordination to the anti-coordination game. These outcomes depend on the intensity of the social concern in the firm’s objective and the network size. The article also pinpoints the welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE and extends the analysis to a Stackelberg rivalry setting.