AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REFERRALS
约40%的工人通过推荐找到工作，其中内部推荐（推荐人在招聘公司工作）的工资高于正式渠道，外部推荐则更低。本文构建了一个均衡模型，引入激励相容机制来解释这一现象，并校准后能捕捉美国劳动力市场的特征。
Abstract About 40% of workers find their jobs through referrals. We distinguish between two types of referrals based on whether the referrer works at the hiring firm (internal referrals) or not (external referrals). Interestingly, jobs found through internal (external) referrals pay more (less) than those found through formal methods. An equilibrium labor market model is then built by introducing an incentive‐compatible mechanism through which workers can share job opening information. A nondegenerate wage distribution arises in equilibrium with a wage premium (penalty) for internal (external) referrals. When calibrated, our model can capture these salient features of the U.S. labor market.