Shareholder activism and accounting reporting complexity
研究了股东积极主义是否导致会计报告更复杂，发现受股东施压的公司会披露更多会计项目，增加报告复杂性，对监管者评估股东积极主义的成本与收益有参考价值。
Purpose In this paper the authors aim to examine whether shareholder activism is associated with accounting reporting complexity (ARC). Design/methodology/approach The authors employ ordinary least squares (OLS) and a sample of 19,530 firm-year observations (representing 3,377 unique firms) over the 2010–2019 period to test the prediction. Findings The authors find that firms with shareholder activism provide more complex accounting reporting. Further, both types of activism (including Concern & Dispute and Control & Discussion) are positively associated with ARC. The authors also find that the association between shareholder activism and ARC is more pronounced when the firms have a higher level of litigation risk and a higher proportion of institutional ownership. Collectively, the findings suggest that firms with shareholder activism may be under more pressure to disclose more accounting items, leading to more complex accounting reporting. Originality/value The study may be informative to regulators considering the costs and benefits of shareholder activism in financial reporting.