Mediating Internal Competition for Resources*
研究了组织中不同偏好的代理人竞争资源时，由温和偏好的经理控制资源分配能促进妥协、提高保险和努力水平，为经理作为资源分配者和冲突解决者的角色提供了理论基础。
We consider a model of internal competition, where projects developed by agents with different preferences compete for resources in an organization. Allowing a manager—who has moderate preferences—to control the allocation of resources has benefits when preferences are not too diverse. In particular, the manager acts as a mediator, forcing agents to compromise when competing projects succeed, thus providing better insurance to agents and increasing their effort. Our framework provides a theoretical foundation for two influential views of a manager—as the “visible hand” that allocates resources, and as a “power broker” who resolves conflict in an organization.