Directors: Older and Wiser, or Too Old to Govern?
研究发现美国治理改革导致董事会老龄化，年长独立董事出席会议更少、担任委员会职务更少、股东支持更低，且与较弱的监督相关，但在特定经验或咨询需求高时能提供宝贵建议。
Abstract An unintended consequence of recent governance reforms in the United States is firms’ greater reliance on older director candidates, resulting in noticeable board aging. We investigate this phenomenon’s implications for corporate governance. We document that older independent directors exhibit poorer board meeting attendance, are less likely to serve on or chair key board committees, and receive less shareholder support in annual elections. These directors are associated with weaker board oversight in acquisitions, CEO turnovers, executive compensation, and financial reporting. However, they can also provide particularly valuable advice when they have specialized experience or when firms have greater advisory needs.