Virtual Shareholder Meetings
研究了企业自愿或强制采用虚拟股东大会的决定因素与后果，发现自愿采用者多为科技公司且更积极参与股东互动，但虚拟形式并未减少信息含量或用于规避股东监督。
We examine determinants and consequences of virtual shareholder meetings (VSMs) using a sample of voluntary (precoronavirus disease 2019) and forced (i.e., because of coronavirus disease 2019) VSM adopters. Voluntary adopters are tech firms and firms traditionally more engaged with shareholders, consistent with the stated objective to increase shareholder participation. In contrast, we do not find that firms choose the virtual format to avoid shareholders’ scrutiny. Textual analysis of transcripts suggests that in VSMs, business presentations by management are less frequent, shorter, and more generic but only among voluntary adopters, suggesting that these properties reflect a firm’s choice rather than are a by-product of the virtual format per se. VSMs are more likely to exhibit no questions during the question and answer period, but conditioned upon having one question, they exhibit the same number of questions; such questions are more negative in tone, inconsistent with managers using the virtual format to filter out hostile questions. Finally, there is some evidence of greater abnormal absolute returns around VSMs, supporting the notion that greater attendance translates into greater information content. Overall, VSMs exhibit less activity on average, consistent with critics’ concerns, but such reduced activity does not appear to cause a loss in information content nor does it appear to reflect an attempt to avoid scrutiny. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4946 .