Holdup, Knowledge Transferability, and Productivity: Theory and Evidence from Knowledge Workers*
研究了解雇成本如何影响知识工作者的生产率，发现当知识可转移性强时，解雇成本上升反而激励工人更努力，并用美国不当解雇法通过作为外生冲击验证了理论。
This article studies how firing costs affect the productivity of knowledge workers. We develop a holdup model in which workers are essential to knowledge transfer between firms and show that if the worker's knowledge stock is sufficiently transferable to competing firms, an increase in firing costs inhibits the firm's ability to hold up the worker and thereby leads to higher effort. We consider the passage of the wrongful discharge laws in the US as an exogenous increase in firing costs and test our theory using data on patents filed at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).