Problem Directors and Corporate Risk‐Taking
研究美国公司发现，任命问题董事（有不良记录或行为问题的董事）会显著提升企业风险承担水平，其机制是降低财务报告质量，且这种损害在问题董事离职后仍持续，最终损害长期企业价值。
Abstract This study investigates the impact of a ‘problem director’ on the risk‐taking propensity of a firm and its consequences for firm value. Analysing a sample of US companies, we find that corporate risk‐taking propensity increases when a firm appoints a problem director. Our results are of economic significance, indicating that a one standard deviation increase in problem director's score leads to a 2.33% to 4.17% increase in corporate risk‐taking. Mediation analysis reveals that a problem director increases firm risk‐taking through reducing financial reporting quality. Further, a firm's risk‐taking increases when a new problem director joins the board, and the damaging effect persists even after the problem director has left. Moreover, if a chief executive officer (CEO) is a problem director, s/he displays a greater predisposition for risk‐taking. Moreover, when a problem director also sits on a board led by a problem CEO, we determine that the former will have an even greater propensity to take risks. Further analysis determines that the presence of problem directors damages long‐term firm value in the aftermath of risk‐taking behaviour. Overall, this study provides fresh evidence revealing a web of connections between a problem director, ineffective corporate governance and a decline in firm value.