Single monopoly profits, vertical mergers, and downstream foreclosure
重新审视芝加哥学派的单一垄断利润理论，通过模型证明上游垄断者纵向整合下游企业后，可通过更激进的定价策略封锁下游市场，产生反竞争效应。
We review the Chicago school's single monopoly profit theory whereby an upstream monopolist cannot increase its profits through vertical integration as it anyway has sufficient market power. In our model the dominant supplier has full bargaining power , uses observable two-part tariffs, and is only constrained by a less efficient source (such as in-house production). We show that, by vertically integrating with a downstream incumbent, the supplier can profitably commit to pricing more aggressively if a downstream entrant refuses its supply contract. This can foreclose the downstream market. The anti-competitive effects arise from the seemingly pro-competitive elimination of double marginalization.