Revisiting corporate governance and financial risk‐taking
研究了美国公司中多种公司治理特征对风险承担的不同影响，发现薪酬结构促进风险承担，而董事会特征则抑制风险承担，为监管者制定保护投资者权益的治理框架提供参考。
Abstract Corporate governance attributes have varying effects on risk taking when variables are examined separately. We study the effects of a large range of corporate governance attributes on risk taking using a comprehensive US sample. Our findings confirm that although there are certain characteristics that drive this positive effect such as compensation structure, there are those which have the opposite effect such as board‐level attributes. Our paper contributes to the broader literature on the relationship between corporate governance and risk in financial institutions, which are often overlooked in traditional studies. We shed light on the importance of studying corporate governance at a granular level rather than using a single index. The findings offer insights to regulators in determining suitable corporate governance frameworks to ensure the protection of investors rights in financial institutions.