The Effects of Fiscal Policy When Planning Horizons are Finite
研究在新凯恩斯模型中，有限规划期限如何影响财政乘数：政府支出乘数变小，劳动减税乘数变大，转移支付乘数为负，且李嘉图等价失效。
Abstract We study the importance of planning horizons for fiscal multipliers in a New‐Keynesian model with bounded rationality. We show that, when agents have shorter planning horizons, government spending multipliers are smaller, whereas labor tax cut multipliers are larger. Furthermore, Ricardian equivalence breaks down, and transfer shocks feature a negative multiplier. Results are driven by the cognitive limitations of finite planning horizons that lead agent's expectations to deviate from the fully rational benchmark. We find larger investment responses, which are more in line with empirical findings than those of models with longer planning horizons, rule‐of‐thumb households, or a Blanchard–Yaari structure.