The impact of recentralization reform on corruption: evidence from a quasi‐natural experiment
利用越南将区级立法职能上收至上级政府的准自然实验，发现集权改革使企业行贿概率降低4.3%，且对无政治关联企业影响更大，为治理腐败提供政策启示。
Abstract How does government recentralization reform affect corruption? We utilize the pilot recentralization reform that transforms the legislative function, power, and responsibility of the district‐level authorities to the higher level of the government organ in Vietnam as a quasi‐natural experiment to address the aforementioned question. We find strong evidence that recentralization reform leads to lower corruption. The result illustrates that, among the firms which have the highest probability of making a bribe payment, those incorporated in jurisdictions experiencing the recentralization reform are 4.3% less likely to pay a bribe. In addition, the perception that bribery is a common and necessary practice is also significantly lowered in the post‐recentralization period. We further show that the impact of recentralization is stronger for firms which lack a political connection. Overall, these results shed light on the real impact of the government recentralization reform and also the determinants of corruption, thereby providing important policy implications for policymakers to create a more conducive business environment.