Search Frictions in Many‐to‐one Markets*
研究多对一贷款市场中搜索摩擦如何影响竞争和匹配效率，发现利率分散反而能改善资源配置效率，并用实证数据验证理论预测。
This article studies how search frictions affect competition and matching efficiency in many‐to‐one loan markets where a borrower requires support from multiple investors and coordination is desired but absent. We develop a dynamic search model and show that borrowers employ mixed strategies in quoting interest rates. More importantly, we find that in many‐to‐one markets, the rate dispersion caused by search frictions facilitates coordination and hence improves allocation efficiency relative to a no friction environment. Further, we empirically present stylized facts consistent with the theoretical predictions and structurally estimate the impact of search frictions on matching efficiency.