The Governance Role of Minority State Ownership in Non‐state‐owned Enterprises: Evidence from Corporate Fraud in China
研究中国非国有企业中少数国有股权如何抑制公司欺诈，发现其通过减少隧道行为、加强内部控制和缓解融资约束发挥作用，对治理薄弱、欺诈动机强的企业效果更明显。
Abstract This study attempts to shed new light on how the state as a minority shareholder benefits stakeholders, by investigating its role in deterring corporate fraud in non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). Through an analysis of publicly traded non‐SOEs in China, this study reveals that minority state ownership negatively impacts firm fraud, and the results hold after alternative tests. The identified channels of this association are that minority state ownership mitigates tunnelling, enhances internal control, and alleviates the financial constraints of non‐SOEs. Further analysis shows that this relationship is more pronounced in firms with weaker corporate governance, stronger fraud incentives, and lower levels of political connections. Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of the role of minority state ownership in emerging markets within the context of corporate fraud, highlighting the importance of critically evaluating the effects of government intervention in different contexts.