Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
通过比较两人团队与个人在无限重复囚徒困境中的行为，发现团队学习合作更快且更稳定，团队对话揭示的策略具有即兴性，合作增加主要源于单方面合作以诱导对手合作。
We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (i) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (ii) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This reflects the improvisational nature of teams’ decision making. (iii) Increasing cooperation was primarily driven by teams unilaterally cooperating in the hope of inducing their opponent to cooperate.