When do stock options affect CEO risk‐taking? The moderating role of CEO regulatory focus
研究发现CEO的内在动机（调节焦点）会调节股票期权对风险承担行为的效果，只有动机适中的CEO才显著受期权激励影响。
Abstract Executive stock options are provided to risk‐averse CEOs to encourage risk‐taking. We show that the efficacy of such stock options is moderated by CEOs’ regulatory focus—their intrinsic motivations to avoid losses or achieve gains. We show that stock options have a negligible impact on the risk‐taking behavior of CEOs who are intrinsically motivated to avoid losses or take on risks. The impact of stock options on firm risk is strongest among CEOs whose regulatory focus is moderate and whose behavior is thus more malleable. Our paper shows that CEO intrinsic risk‐taking motivations have important implications for the effectiveness of extrinsic risk‐taking incentives provided by stock options.