Stakeholder Value: A Convenient Excuse for Underperforming Managers?
研究发现，当公司业绩未达预期时，管理者更可能在公开沟通中强调利益相关者目标，这降低了CEO因业绩差而被解雇的风险，且与实际的ESG活动无关。
Abstract Firms falling short of earnings expectations are more likely to cite stakeholder-focused objectives in their public communications following earnings announcements. This behavior is consistent with managers preferring to be evaluated by subjective stakeholder-based performance criteria when falling short on objective shareholder-based measures. This increased use of stakeholder language is most evident among firms narrowly missing earnings estimates and appears unrelated to a firm’s actual environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-related activity. Stakeholder language appears to influence the evaluation of CEOs; turnover–performance sensitivity is lower for managers citing stakeholder value. Collectively, our findings are consistent with concerns that stakeholder objectives reduce managerial accountability for poor performance.