Electoral Cycles in Macroprudential Regulation
研究了58个国家2000-2014年间221次选举前宏观审慎监管的变化，发现抵押贷款和消费信贷限制在选举前系统性放松，尤其在经济增长期，且选举结果不确定、监管者与政治关联强、制度薄弱时更明显。
Do politics matter for macroprudential policies? I show that changes in macroprudential regulation exhibit a predictable electoral cycle in the run-up to 221 elections across 58 countries from 2000 through 2014. Policies restricting mortgages and consumer credit are systematically looser before elections, particularly during economic expansions. Consistent with theories of opportunistic political cycles, this pattern is stronger when election outcomes are uncertain, regulators are closely tied to politicians, and institutions are poor. These results suggest that political pressures may limit the ability of regulators to “lean against the wind.”