Corporate Monitoring and Misreporting: The Role of Rules-Based and Principles-Based Accounting Standards
研究了审计委员会、董事会、外部审计师和SEC的严格监控与财务错报概率的负相关关系，发现这种关系在规则导向会计准则下比原则导向会计准则下更显著，表明严格监控主要通过确保对详细标准的合规来减少错报。
SUMMARY Prior research provides some evidence that strict corporate monitoring constrains financial misreporting. We examine whether the efficacy of various corporate monitoring mechanisms hinges on the nature of accounting standards—rules-based standards (RBS) versus principles-based standards (PBS)—in place. We generally document that the negative association between the likelihood of misstatements and tough monitoring by audit committees, boards, external auditors, and the SEC is more pronounced under RBS than under PBS. This evidence collectively suggests that most corporate gatekeepers fulfill their monitoring obligations primarily through ensuring better compliance with detailed standards when the applicable standards are more specific and leave less room for discretion. Although some prior studies document higher financial reporting quality under PBS, our results imply that it is important for regulators to also consider the potentially higher monitoring efficacy under RBS when setting accounting standards. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M42.