Family Firms’ Shareholder Structure and International Acquisitions: A Differentiated Socioemotional Wealth Approach
从混合博弈视角出发，研究不同家族股东结构的家族企业在跨国并购决策中的权衡，发现拥有主导家族所有者的企业更倾向跨国并购，尤其在家族CEO领导或业绩低于目标时。
From a mixed gamble perspective, we contend that family firms (FFs) with different family shareholder structures are confronted with different trade-offs among current and prospective financial and socioemotional wealth (SEW), leading to differences in their international acquisition choices. We also explore the moderating role of family leadership and performance aspirations. Our findings show that FFs with a dominant family owner are more likely to pursue international acquisitions, especially when FFs are led by a family CEO or when they experience below-target performance, as in such cases, they prioritize prospective financial and SEW gains, thereby sacrificing current SEW and financial wealth.