Drafting the Great Army: The Political Economy of Conscription in Napoleonic France
研究拿破仑法国如何应对普遍逃避兵役问题，发现政府根据地区地理特征采取差异化征兵率，从而快速降低逃役率。
Napoléon Bonaparte revolutionized the practice of war with his reliance on a mass national army and large-scale conscription. This system faced one major obstacle: draft evasion. This article discusses Napoléon’s response to widespread draft evasion. First, we show that draft dodging rates across France varied with geographic characteristics. Second, we provide evidence that the regime adopted a strategy of discriminatory conscription enforcement by setting a lower (higher) conscription rate for those regions where the enforcement of conscription was more (less) costly. Finally, we show that this strategy resulted in a rapid fall in draft dodging rates across France.