Multihoming and Oligopolistic Platform Competition
研究任意数量对称双边交易平台在买卖双方可多归属时的竞争，分析平台数量、多归属成本比例、交易价值及用户异质性如何共同决定平台收费水平与结构。
We provide a general framework to analyze competition between any number of symmetric two-sided transaction platforms, in which buyers and sellers can multihome. We show how key primitives such as the number of platforms, the fraction of buyers that find multihoming costly, the value of transactions, and the degree of user heterogeneity jointly determine the level and structure of platform fees. Even though platform entry always reduces the total fee level, whether it shifts the fee structure in favor of buyers or sellers depends on whether most of the buyers are singlehoming or multihoming.