A Model of Sequential Crisis Management
研究了多个社会如何应对共同危机，发现政府面临“怎么做都错”的政策困境：强力干预虽能控制危机，但好结果反而让人质疑成本；干预不足则因危机恶化被指责。当多个社会依次应对危机时，后发社会可能因政策困境表现更差，而先发社会却能受益于动态反事实效应。
We propose a model of how multiple societies respond to a common crisis. A government faces a “damned-either-way” policymaking dilemma: aggressive intervention contains the crisis, but the resulting good outcome makes people skeptical about the costly response; light intervention worsens the crisis and causes the government to be faulted for not doing enough. When multiple societies encounter the crisis sequentially, due to this policymaking dilemma, late societies may underperform despite having more information, while early societies can benefit from a dynamic counterfactual effect.