Auctions with Endogenous Initiation
研究了收购拍卖中由潜在买家或卖家启动的机制，发现当买家估值具有共同价值成分时，买家不愿主动表示兴趣，拍卖由卖家启动；而在私人价值拍卖中，两种启动方式都可能出现。
ABSTRACT We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller‐initiated. Conversely, in private‐value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller‐ and bidder‐initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes.