Local government official competition and financial analyst forecasts
研究发现，由省级政府控制的券商分析师对总部位于本省的国有企业发布更乐观的预测，且这种效应在竞争省份的非本省国企中更为显著，地方政府官员可能通过施压分析师来促进自身政治晋升。
Abstract We examine how financial analyst forecasts could be influenced by local political forces. Using Chinese data, we find that financial analysts from brokerage houses controlled by provincial governments issue more optimistic forecasts for state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) headquartered in the home province (i.e., home SOEs) than for nonhome SOEs, and this effect is more pronounced for nonhome SOEs located in competing provinces. Our results remain unchanged in a battery of robustness checks. Further, local officials are more likely to enjoy political career advancement when they pressure analysts to issue optimistic forecasts for home SOEs relative to nonhome SOEs from competing provinces.