Intervention with Screening in Panic‐Based Runs
研究了一种新型干预方案，通过筛查投资者异质性信念来缓解金融系统恐慌性挤兑，相比政府担保成本更低且能避免道德风险。
ABSTRACT Policymakers frequently use guarantees to mitigate panic‐based runs in the financial system. We analyze a binary‐action coordination game under the global games framework and propose a novel intervention program that screens investors based on their heterogeneous beliefs about the system's stability. The program only attracts investors who are at the margin of running, and their participation boosts all investors' confidence in the financial system. Compared with government guarantee programs, our proposed program is as effective at mitigating runs but features two advantages: it costs less to implement and it is robust to moral hazard.