Optimal Accounting Rules, Private Benefits of Control, and Efficient Liquidation
研究了如何设计会计规则来缓解经理人因私人收益导致的无效投资决策，发现私人收益较小时可实现最优，私人收益增大时需更不保守的会计规则。
We study optimal accounting rules that alleviate inefficiencies caused by managerial private benefits. Accounting signals generated by the accounting rules guide the continuation decision at an interim project stage. The entrepreneur enjoys private benefits from continuation, which may induce inefficient decisions. The optimal accounting rule is characterized by a threshold, with a higher threshold representing more conservative accounting. The first-best is achieved under small private benefits. As private benefits increase, the first-best eventually is not achievable and more informative bad news is required for the manager to terminate, resulting in less conservative accounting rules. Therefore, more conservative accounting rules are associated with more efficient investment decisions. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.03087 .