Risk management committee and bank performance: Evidence from the adoption of the Dodd–Frank Act
利用《多德-弗兰克法案》实施带来的准自然实验，研究发现设立风险管理委员会能有效降低银行风险、改善贷款质量并提升盈利能力，且该效应在资产多元化银行中更显著。
Abstract We test the effect of the establishment of a risk management committee on bank risk, bank loan performance and bank profitability. The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 provides us with quasi‐experimental variation on risk management committee establishment that facilitates identification. We identify the risk management committee effect using an instrumental variable model based on the difference‐in‐differences design. We find that the establishment of a risk committee has effectively reduced bank risks. In addition, risk committee member independence, more risk committee meetings and more risk committee members are all instrumental to bank risk reduction. We also find evidence that the risk reduction effect from the risk management committee is more pronounced among asset‐diversified banks. Finally, the establishment of a risk committee helps with loan quality improvement and firm profitability increment, which sheds light on the bright side of stringent bank regulation.