Information Cascades and Threshold Implementation: Theory and an Application to Crowdfunding
将全有或全无阈值引入信息级联模型，发现早期支持者将决策委托给“看门人”，形成单向级联，项目发起人可提高定价，且项目可行性与信息聚合在人群规模大时达到效率。
ABSTRACT Economic interactions often involve sequential actions, observational learning, and contingent project implementation. We incorporate all‐or‐nothing thresholds in a canonical model of information cascades. Early supporters effectively delegate their decisions to a “gatekeeper,” resulting in unidirectional cascades without herding on rejections. Project proposers can consequently charge higher prices. Proposal feasibility, project selection, and information aggregation all improve, even when agents can wait. Equilibrium outcomes depend on crowd size, and project implementation and information aggregation achieve efficiency in the large‐crowd limit. Our key insights hold under thresholds in dollar amounts and alternative equilibrium selection, among other model extensions.