Peer Versus Pure Benchmarks in the Compensation of Mutual Fund Managers
研究了共同基金经理薪酬中使用同行基准（如Lipper经理指数）与纯基准（如标普500）的差异，发现71%的经理基于同行基准获得薪酬，且同行基准能激励更高努力、带来更高业绩和费用收入，同时分析顾问选择基准类型时迎合更成熟、对业绩敏感的投资者。
Abstract We examine the role of peer (e.g., Lipper manager indices) versus pure (e.g., S&P 500) benchmarks in fund manager compensation. We model their impact on manager incentives and then test those predictions using novel data. We find that 71% of managers are compensated based on peer benchmarks. Consistent with the model, peer-benchmarked fund managers exhibit higher effort generating higher gross performance and collect higher fee income. Analyzing advisors’ choice between benchmark types, we show that peer-benchmarking advisors cater to more sophisticated and performance-sensitive investors, and are more likely to sell through direct channels, consistent with investor heterogeneity and market segmentation.