Market Discipline in the Direct Lending Space
利用商业发展公司（BDC）被剔除出股票指数的外生冲击，研究市场纪律在直接贷款市场中的有效性，发现机构投资者抛售导致BDC估值下降、股权融资受限，但BDC通过降低投资组合风险而非调整资本结构来应对，且债务持有人的市场纪律越强，风险降低越明显。
Abstract Using the exclusion of business development companies (BDCs) from stock indexes, this paper studies the effectiveness of market discipline in the direct lending space. Amid share sell-offs by institutional investors, a drop in BDCs’ valuations limits their ability to raise new equity capital. Following this funding shock, BDCs do not adjust their capital structure. At the same time, they are reducing the risk exposure of their portfolios. We document a greater reduction in risk for BDCs subject to stronger market discipline from their debtholders. BDCs pass through the capital shock to their portfolio firms by reducing their investment intensity.